A national UK survey (N=1017) examined the contribution of media consumption to explaining three indicators of civic participation -likelihood of voting, interest in politics, and actions taken in response to a public issue of concern to the respondent. Multiple regression analysis was used to test the variance explained by media use variables after first controlling for demographic, social and political predictors of each indicator of participation. Media use significantly added to the explanation of civic participation as follows. In accounting for voting, demographic and political/social factors mattered, but so too did some media habits (listening to the radio and engagement with the news). Interest in politics was accounted for by political/social factors and by media use, especially higher news engagement and lower media trust. However, taking action on an issue of concern was explained only by political/social factors, with the exception that slightly fewer actions were taken by those who watched more television. These findings provided little support for the media malaise thesis, and instead were interpreted as providing qualified support for the cognitive/motivational theory of news as a means of engaging the public.
, though one should be cautious of concluding that the public would, in consequence, prefer participatory to representative democracy (Coleman 2005) . Accounting for participation Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley (2004) summarize five models of the factors that support active citizenship, distinguishing between choice-based (or utility maximization) theories and structural models of citizenship. The choice theories include 'cognitive engagement' models and those focused on 'general incentives to act'. The former explains why individuals seek civic or political information, and claims that education, knowledge, and motivation are crucial. The latter is concerned to explain why they are motivated to use such information, and so efficacy, social norms regarding participation and personal/group incentives for participation are stressed more. They divide structural models into the 'civic voluntarism' model, the 'equity-fairness' model and the 'social capital' model (Pattie et al. 2004 ). The first explains why people do not become engaged, emphasizing the importance of resources (as measured by socio-economic status), civic skills, mobilization and political efficacy (Verba & Nie 1972) . The equity-fairness model is concerned with social comparisons, low social status, and a sense of relative justice; while explaining the occurrence of non-traditional or non-approved forms of participation, this model is less effective in accounting for the overall decline in participation. The social capital model (Putnam 2000) stresses the importance of social or interpersonal trust in enabling the local or voluntary participation that strengthens community relations, this feeding a virtuous circle of civic engagement.
As Pattie et al. (2004) and others have shown (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Pharr & Putnam 2000) , a fair body of evidence supports each of explanatory factors identified by these models in seeking to explain public participation. Notably, there has been a striking decline in public trust in established political institutions, both in the UK (Electoral Commission 2005b; Kavanagh 1989; Topf 1989) , the USA (Inglehart 1977; Norris 1999) , and elsewhere. A decline in social capital, concomitant with the decline in social trust, suggests a further cause of decreasing political participation. Claiming that, 'the core of the theory of social capital is extremely simple: social networks matter', Putnam (2000: 6) points to the decline of formal associations, captured in his famous image of 'bowling alone' (although see Field 2005; Fine 2001; Hooghe & Stolle 2003; Hall 2002) . Indeed, Bennett (1998) shows that volunteering has increased, with consequences for the relationship between social trust, civic involvement and political engagement (see Cohen 1999; Eliasoph 1998; Fine & Harrington 2004) . Political efficacy (Inglehart 1977 ) may also play a role, for people are unlikely to take action unless they believe they can 'make a difference'. In the UK, 67 per cent agree that 'You want to have a say in how the country is run', but only 27 per cent agree that 'You have a say in how the country is run', pointing to a gap between political commitment and individual efficacy (MORI 2004; see Bromley et al. 2004; Scheufele & Nisbett 2002) . MORI (2004) found that political efficacy (but not social capital or interest in politics) predicted likelihood of voting, as did political knowledge (see also Haste 2004) .
Last, the role of interpersonal discussion has been researched since the original two-step flow model (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; c.f. Beck et al. 2002) . Following Robinson and Levy (1986a) , among others, who showed that talk about the news promotes news comprehension, Eveland (2004) analysed national US survey data to show that such discussion is effective less because it extends exposure to political news but because knowing that one will discuss the news with others encourages an anticipatory elaboration of one's political understanding during and after news exposure; also, the discussion itself helps to elaborate political knowledge and improve understanding. While Eveland takes this as evidence for 'cognitive mediation', one might also point to the social and motivational aspects of discussion (McLeod & Becker 1974) , for social pressure to keep up with the news (Wenner 1985) and to appear informed among peers also reinforces the value and identity aspects of informal civic participation (Dahlgren 2003) or non-participation (Eliasoph 1998) . Media use and civic connection
In parallel with these trends in civic participation, there has been a transformation in the media and communication environment over recent decades. Media channels and contents are increasingly globalized, commercialized and diversified, yet also personalized and individualized. For some, this seems unrelated to participation. Evans and Butt (2005) chart relations between political parties and public opinion over time but treat communication from the parties to the public as unmediated. Bromley et al. (2004) explain declining levels of political trust in terms of the public's perception of the responsibilities of governments, their post-materialist values and declining social trust and/or party identification, but they do not inquire into the media's role in representing Government and parties to the public. Indeed, media-related variables only feature in two of Pattie et al.'s (2004) five models of citizen participation, playing a positive role in the 'cognitive engagement' model, where the focus is on the motivated seeking of political information through news (Norris 2000) , and a negative role in the 'social capital' model, where the focus is on the media distracting people from civic engagement (Putnam 2000) .
Looking more closely at the latter model first, we note that Putnam regards high television consumption as a major cause of declining levels of social capital and civic engagement: 'just as television privatizes our leisure time, it also privatizes our civic activity, dampening our interactions with one another even more than it dampens individual political activities ' (2000: 229) . Indeed, many have judged the media to have 'undercut the kind of public culture needed for a healthy democracy' (Dahlgren 2003: 151) . The media, it is claimed, keep people at home and away from civic and community spaces; distract them by easy entertainment so they neglect more demanding news and current affairs; transform the content of news, in an age of political marketing, so that it encourages cynicism or disengagement (Capella & Jamieson 1996) ; commodify news into branded infotainment and dumbed down journalistic values to the point where fact and fiction are indistinguishable within politics itself (Delli Carpini & Williams 2001) or where the news seems not to speak to people (Hargreaves & Thomas 2002) ; and focus attention on the activities of the traditional (privileged) establishment, silencing difference and dissent (McChesney 2000) . However, this model has been criticized for ignoring a positive role for television news consumption in civic engagement (Norris 1996 (Norris , 2000 . Television remains 'the main source' of news (Robinson & Levy 1986b) , cited as such by three in four British adults; two in three people trust television to provide the most fair and unbiased news (Office of Communications 2004), more than trust the newspapers or internet . Pinpointing the importance of news consumption specifically, Graber (2004) argues that the public gains much of its political knowledge from the news (see also McLeod, Scheufele & Moy 1999) . Since attracting and sustaining citizens' collective attention is a central challenge in modern democracies and a prerequisite for most political or civic action, Graber (2004) analyses citizens' 'information needs', arguing that by addressing the public collectively and providing such information, the media play a role in connecting the public's everyday lifeworld to civic participation.
It seems that insofar as media use is included in explanations of civic participation, researchers are divided over whether it facilitates or undermines participation. Partly, the problem is the focus on different media. For television, the potential to undermine participation is generally stressed, though the specific and positive contribution of television news has been emphasized. By contrast, the role of the press in supporting democracy has long been acknowledged (Graber 2004) . For the recently-arrived internet, some identify an individualizing effect but others point to its community-building and social networking features (Wellman et al. 2001) . Since the media are plural in their cultural and technological forms and modes of address, one should surely expect them also to be plural in their effects. Disaggregating the generic term, 'the media', permits us to frame research questions that distinguish overall media consumption, news consumption and, more specifically still, the social and motivational aspects of a positive engagement with the news, for each of several media. Hence we ask, for television, radio, press and the internet:
RQ1:
In what ways, if at all, does overall media consumption add to the explanation for civic participation, over and above demographic, political and social factors?
RQ2:
In what ways, if at all, does news consumption add to the explanation for civic participation, over and above demographic, political and social factors?
RQ3:
In what ways, if at all, do the social and motivational aspects of news engagement add to the explanation for civic participation, over and above demographic, political and social factors?
Method

Survey sample
The authors commissioned a reputable market research company to administer a telephone survey to a nationally representative quota sample of the population of Great Britain (aged 18+) in June 2005 (N=1017). Quotas were set for age, gender and socioeconomic status (SES) and the results were weighted to the profile of all adults.
Comparison of the survey sample against the 2001 Census confirms that the sample characteristics matched those of the population (Authors, in press).
Measures
Building on standard questions asked in the British Social Attitudes, Electoral Commission, Pew and other surveys, and on qualitative work by the authors (2007), the questionnaire combined items on public and political interest, knowledge and action with questions on media access, use and evaluation. 2 Indicators of civic participation were Likelihood of Voting (a traditional, 'hard' measure), Interest in Politics 3 (a traditional, 'soft' measure) and Actions Taken in response to an issue of concern to the respondent (permitting a diverse range of actions). The explanatory variables consisted either of scales constructed from several items as in previous research (Political Trust, Political Efficacy, Social Capital) or, for a basket of individual items commonly used in previous research but not necessarily interrelated, they comprised scales constructed from an exploratory factor analysis (this identified factors for Social Expectations, News Engagement, Media Trust, and Disengagement) . The Cronbach's alphas were generally adequate (see below), with the exception of Disengagement (alpha=0.35), which was omitted from the present analysis. In addition to the variables used to construct the News Engagement scale, media use was measured through eight items, asking both about overall Media Consumption and specifically News Consumption, for each of four media (television, radio, newspaper, and the internet). For the measures listed below, responses used a 5 point Likert-type rating scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree, unless otherwise stated.
( Scale constructed from four items: 'You trust the television to report the news fairly', 'You trust the press to report the news fairly', 'You trust the internet to report the news fairly', 'You trust the media to cover the things that matter to you' (alpha=0.64; mean=3.26 st.dev.=0.81).
Results
Main descriptive findings
The survey identified considerable support for voting: 82 per cent said they 'generally' vote in national elections. 6 Likelihood of voting was strongly associated with age (r=0.315, p<0.01), with younger voters being ambivalent about voting and the oldest groups more committed voters (63 per cent of the 18-24 year olds, compared with 93 per cent of those over 55, said they generally vote in national elections). Political interest (claimed by 65 per cent overall) was also associated with age (r=0.160, p<0.01), with socioeconomic status (r=-0.125, p<0.01) and, marginally, to gender (r=-0.071, p<0.05). Older and middle class people, and men, reported more interest in politics. There was also a small association between gender and reported number of actions taken (r=-0.077, p<0.05). 7 The survey also showed that, despite the proliferation of media and news sources, for most people television remains the main source of news (c.f. Robinson & Levy, 1986b) : 89 per cent watch the news at least three times per week, while 71 per cent listen to radio news three times per week(higher for men and middle class people), 61 per cent read the national paper (more men and older people), over half (56 per cent) read their local newspaper, and only 23 per cent use the internet to access the news three times per week (more men, younger and middle class people). Further, most people trust television news (68 per cent), compared with trusting the press (40 per cent) and online news (36 per cent).
Predicting participation
Given scepticism over whether and how media use plays a role in explaining civic participation, an analytic strategy based on hierarchical multiple regression was conducted separately for each of the three indicator variables. First, we controlled for the exogenous variables that were expected to influence the relationship between the main variables of interest and the indicator variables (Hays, 1988) , by entering age, gender and SES (using the enter method) into an ordinary least squares regression model. 8 Second, we examined the explanatory value of measures traditionally considered by political science (social capital, social expectations, political efficacy, political trust, political talk), by adding these as a second block of variables into the analysis (using the stepwise method within the block). Last, we tested whether the media use variables added significantly to the models by entering these (using the stepwise method) as a third block.
The demographic variables entered in the first block (see Table I ) accounted for 11 per cent of the variance in likelihood of voting, with older, more middle-class people being more likely to vote. For political interest, the demographic variables accounted for only 6 per cent of the variance, again with older and more middle class people claiming interest, though gender now also added to the equation. Interestingly, for the numbers of actions taken, the demographic variables played no role at all. <Table I about here> What role do the social and political variables play? When these variables were added to the model in a second block, a more satisfactory explanation resulted for each indicator variable (see Table II ). For voting, the R-squared increased significantly (p<0.01) to 16 per cent. In addition to the influence of age and SES, people are more likely to vote, it seems, if they feel more efficacious, if they trust politicians, and if they are higher in social capital. Social pressures to 'keep up', along with the degree to which they talk about issues of importance to them with others, did not affect voting.
For political interest, the R-squared jumped to 17 per cent when the second block of variables was included (significance of R-squared increase, p<0.01). An additional 11 per cent of the variance was accounted for by political efficacy and social capital (as for voting), as well as talk about issues and social expectations, though political trust played no role. The importance of talk and of social expectations in fostering an interest in politics is noteworthy.
Accounting for action required a different explanation. Adding the second block resulted in a significant increase in the variance explained to nearly 15 per cent (significance of the increase, p<0.01). Those who take more actions in relation to an issue of importance to them were more likely to be higher in social capital and political efficacy and, again, they were more likely to talk about issues with others. Social expectations to keep up with events played no role, while political trust was negatively associated with actions. 9 <Table II about here>
A single dimension of media use?
The crux of our present concern is whether various forms of media use, disaggregated by medium and consumption type, can improve the above accounts of participation. Examination of the correlation matrix for the media use variables confirmed a complex pattern of interrelations that did not permit constructing a single media use scale or, even, separate scales for overall media consumption and news consumption. 10 For example, time spent with newspapers was positively correlated with time spent with television (r=0.102, p<0.01) and radio (r=0.091, p<0.01) but negatively correlated with internet use (r=-0.057, p<0.01). However, time spent with television, though positively associated with reading the paper, was negatively correlated with both radio (r=-0.82, p<0.01) and internet use (r=-0.111, p<0.01). Similarly, those who seek television news were also likely to get news from the newspaper (r=0.162, p<0.01) and radio (r=0.073, p<0.01) but not from the internet (n.s.). Indeed, those who get news online seemed to have distinct rather than general news habits, this being largely uncorrelated with news consumption from other media. Thus in the analyses that follow, the media consumption and news consumption variables were not aggregated across media or consumption types.
A role for media use in explaining participation?
In the third phase of the analysis, we tested whether the media variables added to the regression equations already established for the three indicator measures of participation, thus extending the hierarchical regression models by including a third block (using the stepwise method within the block).
To address RQ1, the third block comprised the measures of overall media consumption (for television, radio, newspaper and internet; see Table III ). These added marginally if significantly (p<0.01) to the regression equation for voting, raising the R-squared from 16 per cent to 17 per cent, though only radio consumption contributed significantly. For political interest, adding media consumption variables increased the Rsquared by 1 per cent, again a significant (p<0.05) but small increase: both reading the newspaper and listening to the radio added to the explanation for political interest. 11 Last, when predicting actions taken, media consumption variables made only a marginal difference, adding 1 per cent to the R-squared (p<0.05): in this equation, what mattered was amount of television viewed -those who watch more television take fewer actions on issues that matter to them. <Table III about here> For RQ2, the news consumption variables instead were added as Block 3, following the demographic variables (Block 1) and the social/political variables (Block 2). For voting, these four news consumption variables added nothing to the regression equation. For political interest, news consumption added marginally to the variance explained (R-squared increase = 1 per cent, p<0.01): a regular habit of gaining one's news from the newspaper, radio and internet adds to political interest; only television news makes no difference. Last, adding news consumption variables to the regression equation for actions taken made no difference (see Table IV ). <Table IV about here> Finally, to address RQ3, the third category of media variables (news engagement and media trust) were entered as Block 3 into the regression equations. In predicting voting, adding this third block added 3 per cent to the R-squared (a significant increase, p<0.01), this reflecting the contribution of news engagement only, not media trust. For political interest, the increase was more dramatic, adding 8 per cent to the R-squared (p<0.01): not only news engagement but also media trust contributed to predicting political interest, but the latter bore a negative relation to political interest. As for numbers of actions taken, adding the third block made no difference (see Table V ). In short, news engagement matters for voting and, especially, for political interest, but it does not stimulate taking action in consequence. <Table V about here> Discussion and conclusions For those sceptical that everyday media use contributes, positively or negatively, to civic participation, the present findings provide some support. In each regression model presented above, demographic variables and traditional political and social factors taken together account for the largest proportion of the variance explained. For the likelihood of voting, demographic variables (age and SES) were most important (c.f. Scheufele & Nisbet 2002) , while for political interest and taking action, the political and social factors were more important (especially social capital and political efficacy; c.f. Pattie et al. 2004 ). These variables accounted for between 15-17 per cent of the variance in our three indicators, a respectable if moderate finding consistent with previous research.
Notwithstanding continued theoretical debates over social capital (Field, 2005; Fine 2001; Hooghe & Stolle 2003; Putnam 2000) , we conclude that this is important for all three indicators of participation: the 18 per cent who reported playing an active role in local organizations, and the 28 per cent who said they did voluntary work, were also more likely to vote, be interested in politics, and take various forms of action. Political efficacy was also important for all three forms of participation: people need to feel that their actions have consequences, that they can make a difference. Thus the rather low levels of political efficacy help explain low levels of participation: 73 per cent said they sometimes feel strongly about something but did not know what to do about it, suggesting the opportunity structures for action are lacking (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996) . Political trust played a more complex role: greater trust was positively associated with voting, unrelated to political interest, and negatively related to taking action (a lack of trust appears to motivate people to take action; see Misztal 1996) . Talk mattered for interest in politics and for taking action, but was unrelated to voting, supporting the view that talk stimulates civic engagement (Cho 2005; Eliasoph 2004; Shah et al. 2005; Wyatt, Katz, & Kim 2000) . Last, social expectations mattered only for political interest, where being expected by peers to 'keep up' and to 'be in touch' seems effective, but such expectations did not influence the behavioural measures of voting and taking action.
Since the explanation of different indicators of participation varies, we should expect the role of media use also to vary for different forms of participation. This proved to be the case. In accounting for the likelihood of voting, media consumption (listening to the radio, which was correlated positively with reading the paper and negatively with watching television) made a very small difference, and specific news consumption made none. The social/motivational construct of news engagement contributed more, suggesting that it is an active and sustained engagement with the news, rather than its mere habitual use, that makes people more likely to vote (as proposed by RQ3).
A similar picture emerged for political interest. Here too, media consumption (reading the newspaper and listening to the radio) added a little to the explanation of interest. News consumption made a small contribution (specifically, the regular habit of gaining news from the newspaper, radio and internet, though not from television). However, a positive engagement with the news (again, as in RQ3) contributed most, as did media trust (a negative relation). In short, when controlling for demographic and social/political factors, those high in news engagement and low in media trust sustained a greater interest in politics (and vice versa) .
Taking action on a matter of concern to the respondent, however, was explained only by the social and political factors of efficacy, social capital, and talk. Media consumption made only a small difference, albeit an interesting one given the debate over Putnam's thesis, for the only media variable entering the equation was watching television, suggesting that those who watch more television take fewer actions on issues that matter to them (as in RQ1). However, news consumption and news engagement made no difference to taking action.
In sum, there is little support here for what Norris (2000) terms the 'media malaise' thesis (media as a distraction from or 'dumbing down' of the political agenda), with the exception of taking action. The stronger finding is that use of media and, especially, a positive engagement with the news, seems to sustain both voting and an interest in politics. Though we cannot determine causality in a cross-sectional study, it seems that news engagement feeds into a virtuous circle: the already-engaged become more interested and engaged; however, the opposite, 'vicious circle' is also indicated, with the unengaged becoming less interested or engaged (Authors 2007; Norris 2000) . Note that news engagement, as defined here, combines the cognitive, motivational, habitual and normative in a manner that consistent with qualitative work on news consumption in everyday life (Authors 2007; BBC 2002; Bennett 1998) , integrating several features of Dahlgren's 'circuit of civic engagement' (values, affinity, identity and talk).
The picture is different for different media, suggesting that the content of the media matters (Newton 1999) . Reading the newspaper and listening to the radio, whether in general or just for the news, contributed most to civic participation, particularly to the likelihood of voting and political interest. The internet played little role, at least in these UK data (see also Lusoli, Ward, & Gibson 2006 12 , although Shah et al. (2005 report a greater role in the USA). We therefore conclude, with Scheufele and Nisbet (2002) , that the widespread optimism over the potential of the internet for enhancing civic participation is, at best, premature. Last, although television remains the main source for news, television consumption did not discriminate the more from the less civically engaged. However, there is a hint, in the present analysis, of support for Putnam's Bowling Alone thesis, with those who watch less television being more likely to take action on a public issue (see Hooghe 2002) ; contrary to Putnam, television does not appear to undermine political interest or voting, but for the 'additional' or more diverse civic activities (ranging from signing a petition to contacting a politician or making a protest), more television consumption may distract people from taking such actions.
As regards the different forms of participation, we note that media use played a greater role in explaining political interest, the 'softest' of our indicators of participation, than in explaining the 'harder' measure of voting, and its contribution to explaining action is both small and negative. Since media use did not contribute to the behavioural measure of taking action even, as here, on an issue selected by the respondent to be of direct concern, the present research adds to the argument that there is a disconnection, rather than a straightforward connection, between political interest and taking action (see Authors, in press, for a review). However, since political interest was strongly correlated with voting and action 13 , there may be some indirect consequences of using media to sustain interest that, in turn, have consequences for civic participation.
In conclusion, we find that civic participation is, to a moderate degree, influenced by media use. While such influence differs for different media and for different forms of participation, there is more evidence that media use enhances than undermines participation. However, media use plays the greatest role is sustaining political interest, and is lacking or even negative in relation to taking action. Further research is needed on the specific patterns of overall media consumption versus specifically news consumption and, more especially, on the nature of people's cognitive, social and motivational engagement with the news media, which we have here termed news engagement. 
